The short version

• Whether Starlink is legal depends on where the dish is, not where the satellites are licensed. International radio rules require every transmitting station, including a user terminal, to be licensed by the government of the country where it operates.
• A US licence from the FCC does not authorise service abroad. SpaceX’s January 2026 Gen2 authorisation, for example, ties some operations outside the United States to approval from “the relevant administration”.
• Each country runs its own process. The UK licenses Starlink’s user terminals under a single network licence held since November 2020; India granted a telecoms licence and a space regulator authorisation in 2025 but service waits on spectrum assignment; in other countries Starlink is not licensed at all.
• Using a terminal where it is not authorised can breach national law, and the ITU’s Radio Regulations Board has told the United States and Norway that unauthorised Starlink transmissions from Iran contravene Article 18 of the Radio Regulations.

“Is Starlink legal in my country?” is one of the most common questions people ask about satellite internet, and it rarely gets a precise answer. The satellites pass over almost everywhere. The dish works almost anywhere with a clear view of the sky. But legality is decided on the ground, country by country, and the rules behind that are older than any satellite constellation.

This explainer sets out how satellite internet is licensed, why a US licence is not enough, and what happens when a terminal is used where it has not been authorised. Starlink is the example because it is the largest system, but the same rules apply to Amazon Leo, Eutelsat OneWeb and any other operator.

The rule that decides it: licences follow the transmitter

The foundation is the ITU Radio Regulations, a treaty-level instrument binding on ITU Member States. Provision No. 18.1 says, in substance, that no transmitting station may be established or operated by a private person or company without a licence issued by or on behalf of the government of the country to which the station is subject.

A Starlink dish is a transmitting station. It sends signals up to the satellite as well as receiving them. So each dish, like each gateway that connects the network to the internet, needs authorisation from the country where it operates. The satellites in orbit are a different matter: they are licensed by the State that files and notifies them at the ITU, and that State takes on obligations for them, as we explained in our piece on ITU spectrum and orbital slots.

That produces two layers of permission. The operator needs authority for its satellite system from its home regulator, and then needs authority in every country where it wants to serve customers, often called landing rights or market access, covering the gateways, the user terminals and the spectrum they use. Without the second layer, service in that country is unlawful, whatever the home regulator has approved.

The home licence: what the FCC does and does not cover

SpaceX’s satellites are licensed in the United States by the Federal Communications Commission. On 9 January 2026 the FCC’s Space Bureau issued DA 26-36, which raised SpaceX’s second-generation authorisation to 15,000 satellites across shells between 340 km and 535 km, covering fixed and mobile satellite services and supplemental coverage from space.

The order is careful about the border. It waived the international power limits that protect geostationary satellites only for operations “inside the United States”, and said that outside the United States, SpaceX “must continue to comply with the Commission’s and ITU’s EPFD rules and limits”, unless it “receives authorization from the relevant administration”. For direct-to-cell service abroad, SpaceX must not cause harmful interference to stations operating under the ITU rules and must certify to the FCC before starting. The FCC licence, in other words, assumes that foreign operations will be authorised by foreign governments. It does not purport to authorise them. Our piece on the FCC’s direct-to-device overhaul covers the domestic side of those rules.

The national layer: three ways countries do it

There is no single international licence for satellite internet, so the national layer varies widely. Three examples show the range.

The United Kingdom. Ofcom uses two licence types for non-geostationary systems, set out on its NGSO licensing page. A Satellite (Earth Station Network) licence “authorises an unlimited number of user terminals” to connect to a constellation, and a separate licence covers each gateway. Ofcom’s register shows Starlink Internet Services Limited holding a network licence first issued on 16 November 2020 and its own gateway licences at three UK sites from 14 November 2022. Before granting, Ofcom publishes applications for comment and checks coexistence with other licensed constellations. For a UK consumer, that means the dish needs no individual licence; the operator’s network licence covers it. Our UK space law explainer covers the separate regime for UK launches and satellites.

India. India has shown how many steps a national process can involve. According to PTI, the Department of Telecommunications granted Starlink’s Indian company a satellite internet licence in June 2025, making it the third such licensee after Eutelsat OneWeb and Jio Satellite Communications. On 8 July 2025 the space regulator IN-SPACe authorised the Starlink Gen1 constellation for five years. Neither approval let service begin: operators can start only once spectrum is assigned. In May 2026 Starlink was still responding to a TRAI consultation on a framework for satellite communication network authorisation and spectrum assignment under the Telecommunications Act, 2023.

Countries with ownership conditions. Some States make local ownership a condition of a telecoms licence. In South Africa, a requirement that licensees be at least 30% owned by historically disadvantaged groups has kept Starlink out; a 2025 effort to accept equity equivalent investment instead had not resolved the matter by May 2026, according to TechCabal. Nothing in international law requires a State to admit a foreign satellite operator, so these conditions are lawful choices, however much operators dislike them.

Beyond these, countries also apply equipment type approval, import controls and lawful interception or data localisation conditions. A dish can be legal to own and illegal to switch on, or legal to import only with approval.

What happens when a dish is used where it is not licensed

The legal consequences fall first on the user. Operating an unlicensed transmitter is an offence in most national telecoms laws, and the terminal can be seized. Norway told the ITU in 2024 that Starlink services are not marketed or sold, and cannot be activated, in any country that has not authorised them.

The harder question is what the operator and its licensing State must do when terminals are smuggled in and used anyway. Iran has pressed this at the ITU since 2023. At its 96th meeting in June 2024, the ITU’s Radio Regulations Board considered submissions from Iran, the United States and Norway, which the minutes identify as the notifying administration for the relevant Starlink satellite filings, with the United States as an associated administration.

The United States argued that its obligations did not extend to “the activities of smugglers”, which it called “primarily a domestic issue”, and that switching off beams over an area was “neither required nor practicable” for a global constellation. Norway said the operator could disable a particular terminal brought to its attention. Board members noted reports that the operator had disabled unauthorised terminals in other countries; one member cited deactivations in 37 African countries after a 30 April 2024 deadline.

The Board’s conclusion was blunt. It “reiterated that the provision of transmissions from within any territories where they had not been authorized was in direct contravention of the provisions of Article 18” and of Resolution 22 (WRC-19) and Resolution 25 (Rev.WRC-03). It “strongly urged” Norway and the United States to take “immediate action to disable STARLINK terminals operating within the territory” of Iran “in the same manner as the operator had done in several other countries”. It also reminded Iran that, as the reporting administration, it must take the actions at its disposal to stop unauthorised transmissions.

The Board has no enforcement power. Its decisions carry weight as the authoritative reading of the Radio Regulations, but compliance depends on the administrations concerned. The case shows a real tension between a State’s sovereign right to license transmitters on its territory and the political pressure to keep communications open to people living under censorship. Norway noted in the same proceedings that studies under agenda item 1.5 of the 2027 World Radiocommunication Conference are examining whether new regulations are needed.

Why this matters beyond Starlink

Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty makes States responsible for the space activities of their companies. The ITU rules add a second, more granular responsibility: the notifying administration must cooperate to stop interference and unauthorised transmissions linked to its systems. As more constellations offer service direct to ordinary phones, the line between a licensed and an unlicensed transmitter becomes harder to police, because a handset does not look like a satellite dish.

For users and businesses, the practical rule is simple. Check whether the operator is authorised in the country where the terminal will be used, not where it was bought. For travellers and maritime or aviation users, check the specific roaming or mobility authorisation, because a licence for fixed use may not cover use in motion.

What I would watch

The first is WRC-27. If the 2027 conference adopts new rules on unauthorised earth station operation, notifying administrations could face clearer obligations to geofence service, which would change the default from “the user’s problem” to “the operator’s problem”.

The second is India’s spectrum framework. How TRAI and the government settle authorisation and spectrum assignment for satellite networks will determine when Starlink, OneWeb and Jio can offer commercial service, and on what terms.

The third is ownership rules. South Africa’s debate over equity equivalents is being watched across Africa, and the outcome will show whether investment commitments can stand in for local shareholding in telecoms licensing.

The fourth is direct-to-device service. National regulators that license mobile spectrum to terrestrial carriers will need to decide how satellites using that spectrum are authorised, and whether the carrier’s licence or a separate satellite authorisation is the legal basis.