First Committee Outer Space Resolutions 2026: The Votes, the Split and What Comes Next

Each autumn the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which deals with disarmament and international security, votes on a cluster of outer space texts. This year the votes on 29 October came shortly after a Russian military satellite manoeuvred close to a commercial radar satellite, and that incident ran through almost every Western explanation of vote.

The votes create nothing binding, but they show where roughly 180 States stand on the question that will shape space security law for the next decade: whether to negotiate a treaty banning weapons in orbit, or to build up norms of behaviour first. The vote figures below are from the UN’s transcript of the Committee’s 26th meeting, and the texts are the drafts on the UN’s document system.

The four outer space texts

The Committee took action on four drafts under its outer space cluster.

The first was A/C.1/81/L.3, “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, tabled by Egypt and Sri Lanka. It says the existing legal regime “by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space” and invites the Conference on Disarmament to set up a working group on the subject.

The second was A/C.1/81/L.52, a one-paragraph draft decision sponsored by Russia, China and nine others. It simply keeps “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities” on the Assembly’s agenda for next year.

The third was A/C.1/81/L.53, “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space”, led by Russia. It declares that keeping outer space out of the arms race “should become a mandatory norm of State policy and a generally recognized international obligation”. It urges the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a legally binding instrument, welcomes the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space that China and Russia tabled in 2008 and updated in 2014, and recommends that the working group consider “substantial elements” of such an instrument.

The fourth was A/C.1/81/L.54, “No first placement of weapons in outer space”, also led by Russia. It urges early substantive work based on that same draft treaty and encourages States to consider a political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space.

How the votes went

According to the UN transcript of the meeting, the results were:

L.3, prevention of an arms race in outer space: more than 180 in favour and 2 against (the transcript and the published summaries differ slightly on the exact yes count). The United States said afterwards that it had voted against.

L.52, the transparency decision: 133 in favour, 2 against, 46 abstentions.

L.53, further practical measures: 124 in favour, 50 against, 9 abstentions.

L.54, no first placement: 123 in favour, 53 against, 7 abstentions.

Both Russian resolutions also faced a separate vote on their fifth preambular paragraph. In each text, on my reading of the drafts, that is the paragraph referring to “a community of shared future for humankind”. Both paragraphs were retained, by 106 to 49 with 12 abstentions in L.53 and by 109 to 50 with 10 abstentions in L.54.

The gap between more than 180 and roughly 124 is the story. Almost everyone supports the general goal. About fifty States, essentially the EU, the wider Western group and close partners, will not support texts that point towards the Russian and Chinese treaty draft.

Why the US, the EU and their partners voted no

The EU’s explanation of vote, delivered by Ireland before the vote, made three points. First, L.53 leaves the question of what counts as a weapon in space ambiguous, when almost any object could be used aggressively. Second, neither text deals with threats from the ground to space systems or with the misuse of space systems to interfere with others. Third, and this was new language this year, both texts make a ban on placing weapons in space the main goal, which in the EU’s view prejudges the outcome of the open-ended working group.

The United Kingdom then spoke for 27 States, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Poland and the Republic of Korea. Its principal concern was verification. Space objects are small, distant and fast, payloads are easy to conceal and much of the technology is dual use, so a ban on placing weapons in orbit cannot, in the group’s view, be credibly verified, and an unverifiable ban would increase ambiguity rather than reduce it. The group said it remained open to legally binding measures that are clearly defined and verifiable, but believes non-binding measures focused on behaviour offer better prospects for now.

The United States went further, saying that Russia and China have developed, tested and operationalised anti-satellite weapons, and urging the Committee to abandon the draft treaty in favour of voluntary, behaviour-based measures that could, over time and with State practice, harden into legal obligations.

On the other side, India said it had traditionally supported L.53 and L.54 because the legal regime for outer space needs to be consolidated and reinforced. That is the majority view, and it is why the Russian texts keep passing.

Cosmos 2612 and the transparency decision

The sharpest change this year was on L.52. A decision that only keeps an agenda item alive would normally be adopted without a vote. The EU explained its abstention by pointing to the manoeuvres of the Russian military satellite Cosmos 2612 near ICEYE-X36 and to Russia’s failure to explain them. In its view, that conduct undercut the very transparency the decision is meant to promote.

The United States also abstained and said the vote did not detract from its support for voluntary transparency measures. The UK-led group said it would not oppose the decision, but described the close approach as irresponsible and dangerous and hard to read as anything other than an on-orbit weapons test. Our earlier analysis of the law on rendezvous and proximity operations after Cosmos 2612 explains why no treaty rule sets a minimum distance between satellites.

I think the 46 abstentions matter more than the outcome. They show that a commercial satellite incident can now move votes in the General Assembly, which is a change from the days when space security debates were about missiles and treaties alone.

Is any of this law?

No. First Committee texts are recommendations to the General Assembly, and Assembly resolutions on these subjects are not binding. The binding rules remain the treaties. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty bans placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit and bars military bases and weapons testing on celestial bodies, but it does not prohibit conventional weapons in orbit or anti-satellite systems as such. Our explainer on space weapons and the Outer Space Treaty covers that gap.

The votes still have legal significance in two ways. They are evidence of State positions, which matters if anyone later argues that a customary rule against placing weapons in orbit is forming. On these numbers, with fifty States consistently opposed, including most of the major spacefaring democracies, I do not see that argument succeeding. They also set the terms of the negotiation in the working group. Each side wants the record to support its preferred outcome, which is why the EU said it would not accept these resolutions being cited as support for a legally binding instrument in the group’s final report.

For commercial operators, there is no prospect of a binding treaty on space weapons in the near term. Their protection against hostile or reckless conduct in orbit will keep coming from national licensing, voluntary norms and the general law of State responsibility. Our piece on anti-satellite weapons and international law sets out what that general law does and does not cover.

The working group behind the votes

The forum that actually matters is the open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, created by General Assembly decision 79/512 of 2 December 2024 with an agenda and indicative timetable running from 2025 to 2028. L.3 calls it a “new consolidated” group: it brings together debates that had previously run on separate tracks, on norms of responsible behaviour and on a legally binding instrument. The fight over the Russian texts is a fight over how that group’s mandate should be read.

The same morning, the First and Fourth Committees held a joint panel on space security and sustainability, with UNOOSA’s Director and speakers from LeoLabs and Astroscale UK. The Fourth Committee handles the peaceful uses side through COPUOS, and the joint format suggests debris, traffic and security are increasingly treated as one problem.

What I would watch

The first is the General Assembly plenary in December. The texts usually pass again on similar numbers. Any movement among the small group of abstaining States would be the first sign of a shift.

The second is the working group’s sessions in 2027 and its final report at the end of its 2025 to 2028 timetable. Watch whether the report records a preference for a legally binding instrument or for behaviour-based measures, because both sides are already building the record for that fight.

The third is whether Cosmos 2612 becomes a pattern. If more Western States begin to treat Russian sponsorship of transparency texts as a reason to abstain, those consensus decisions may stop being consensus at all.

Anuj KumarEditor-in-Chief

Anuj Kumar is the founder of Legal Desire Media and publishes Fashion Law Journal and Space Law Journal.

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