Space Law in Germany: The Satellite Data Security Act, the 2024 Key Points and the Draft Weltraumgesetz

Germany builds satellites and has a growing group of launch and Earth observation start-ups. Yet a company in Munich or Bremen that wants to operate a communications satellite does not need a German space licence, because no such licence exists.

France, Japan, the UK and, since April, Poland all have general space activities statutes. This guide explains space law in Germany as of 11 November 2026: what is regulated today, what the Government proposed in 2024 and what is known about the draft bill now under negotiation.

Why Germany needs a space law at all

The reason is Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. States bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including those of private companies, and must authorise and continuously supervise them. Under Article VII and the Liability Convention, a launching State is liable to other States for damage caused by space objects.

The Federal Government set out the problem plainly in its 2024 key points, published as Bundestag printed paper 20/12775: Germany must authorise, supervise and register non-state space activity, but has no means to control or intervene in it or to take recourse against operators, and in a defence emergency cannot draw on private space systems. That last point has shaped everything since.

What is regulated today: the Satellite Data Security Act

The one space-specific statute in force is the Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz (SatDSiG) of 23 November 2007, last amended in 2021. It does not regulate space activities generally. It regulates high-grade Earth remote sensing systems and the data they produce, for security and foreign policy reasons.

Under section 1, the Act applies to the operation of such systems by German nationals and companies, by foreign companies with their administrative seat in Germany, and where the satellite is commanded from German territory, and to handling the data until it is disseminated. A system is “high-grade” if its sensors can produce data with a particularly high information content, judged mainly by resolution, with thresholds set by regulation.

Section 3 requires a licence to operate such a system. Under section 4, the operator must be reliable, and the commands controlling the satellite, its sensors and its data transmissions must be generated in Germany and protected against tampering by a procedure tested and approved by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI). The competent authority under section 24 is the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA).

The most distinctive feature is the sensitivity check in section 17. Before serving a data request, a provider must assess whether the information content, target area, time of acquisition and receiving ground stations together create a risk to Germany’s essential security interests, the peaceful coexistence of peoples or its foreign relations, and must verify who will receive the data. Sensitive requests need a separate permit.

Operating a high-grade system without a licence is an administrative offence punishable by a fine of up to €500,000 under section 28. Under section 29, an intentional breach capable of seriously endangering those security interests is a crime punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.

For operators, this means Germany regulates what a satellite sees more closely than whether it is safe to launch.

The 2024 key points for a Weltraumgesetz

On 4 September 2024 the then Federal Government adopted key points for a Space Act (Weltraumgesetz, WRG), published as a Bundestag paper the next day. They remain the most detailed official statement of what a German space law would contain.

Scope. The WRG would apply to space activities and launch sites operated by German nationals, companies with their registered or administrative seat in Germany and German public bodies; to activities launched from German territory or German-registered ships and aircraft; and to launch sites in Germany. Activities of the Federation and the Länder, of ESA, EUMETSAT and NATO, of the EU and under the ISS framework would be excluded. The authority could waive the Act where an activity is already subject to a foreign regime with a comparable level of protection.

Authorisation. Full or partial space activities would need authorisation, as would material changes and transfers to another operator. The conditions covered the operator’s reliability and competence, state-of-the-art precautions for public safety, for sustainable use of space and against debris, the absence of any threat to national security, defence or Germany’s international obligations, a plan for ending the activity, and proof of financial security. A satellite constellation with a common function would count as a single activity. Launch sites would need separate approval including an environmental impact assessment.

Recourse and insurance. Where Germany is liable to another State under the space treaties, it would have a strict-liability recourse claim against the operator. If the operator acted neither intentionally nor with gross negligence and complied with its authorisation, recourse per incident would be capped at 10% of its average annual turnover over the last three financial years, and at most €50 million, using group turnover for group companies. The same figure would set the insurance or bank guarantee required. Universities and research institutions would be exempt from recourse unless they acted intentionally or with gross negligence. The key points say expressly that civil damages claims by victims against the operator would be unaffected.

Supervision and defence access. The authority could issue enforceable orders to protect public safety, national security, defence interests and the sustainable use of space. The Bundeswehr would be able to demand priority provision of services from operators where needed for defence, in particular to avert an external threat to the existence of the Federation, limited to what is indispensable and against market-rate or at least cost-covering compensation plus a reasonable profit margin. Civil protection and security authorities would have had similar rights in a declared public emergency.

Authority. A body within the Economy Ministry’s remit would decide applications, with the German Space Agency at DLR as a possible administrative helper. Other ministries would have one week to say they wanted to examine an application and three more weeks to give their vote, and authorisation would require their agreement.

The 2026 draft bill

After the 2025 election, responsibility for space moved to the new Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space (BMFTR). In March 2026 the ministry confirmed to Table.Briefings that a draft bill for a national space law was being prepared.

In early October 2026 Politico reported on the ministry’s draft, as summarised on 2 October by the dts news agency. According to that report, the draft builds on the 2024 key points, keeps the Bundeswehr’s right to request space services from private operators for defence, limited to what is indispensable and against market-rate or at least cost-covering compensation, and drops the equivalent rights for civil protection and other security authorities. A single authority would oversee space activities and launch facilities and could temporarily take over control of a space object or prohibit an activity. State space activities would be excluded. The draft was in interministerial review, with cabinet approval planned for October.

On 15 October, law firm Heuking wrote that publication of the draft was expected shortly. I have not found a published draft or a cabinet decision as of 11 November 2026, so the details above should be treated as reported rather than confirmed.

The liability question

The 2024 design caps only the State’s recourse claim. A victim’s own claim against the operator under German civil law would not be capped, and the key points offer no State guarantee above the cap. France, by contrast, guarantees operators above a ceiling, as our guide to space law in France explains, and Poland limits the State’s recourse to the insured sum, at most €60 million, without a guarantee. A German start-up with modest turnover would face a low recourse cap but unlimited exposure to direct claims, which insurers will price.

Defence access and the EU Space Act

The Bundeswehr access clause is the most politically sensitive part. It reflects a wider trend of States treating commercial satellites as defence infrastructure, which carries its own risks under the law of armed conflict, as we discussed in our piece on commercial satellites as military targets.

The other constraint is Brussels. The 2024 key points said the WRG would be adapted if the EU Space Act progressed. It has: the Council is working on the Irish Presidency’s compromise text, covered in our report on the Irish Presidency compromise, and Parliament’s industry committee is expected to vote on 19 November 2026. A German statute adopted first may have to be reworked once an EU regulation applies.

What I would watch

The first is the cabinet decision and the published text. Until then, the licensing authority, the liability figures and the treatment of constellations are only reported.

The second is whether the recourse cap survives in the 2024 form. A cap tied to turnover helps start-ups, but without a State guarantee it leaves direct claims open.

The third is the fit with the EU Space Act. If Brussels sets authorisation and safety rules for all operators serving the EU market, Germany’s law may end up covering mainly what the EU leaves to Member States: liability, insurance, registration and defence access.

Anuj KumarEditor-in-Chief

Anuj Kumar is the founder of Legal Desire Media and publishes Fashion Law Journal and Space Law Journal.

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