Satellite Export Controls Explained: ITAR, the EAR and Launching Abroad
Satellite export controls explained: how ITAR and the EAR split spacecraft, what counts as an export, rules for launching abroad and the October proposal.
Satellite export controls decide who a space company can hire, which partners can see its designs, where it can launch and even which insurers can read its technical files. For non-US companies they follow any US-origin component into the supply chain. This explainer reflects the regulations in the eCFR as of 19 October 2026 and the State Department’s proposal of 1 October 2026.
Two regimes, one satellite
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) implement section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) and are run by the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. They cover items on the US Munitions List (22 CFR 121.1). Category XV covers spacecraft and related articles, and Category IV covers launch vehicles, missiles and rockets.
The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are run by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. They cover dual-use items listed on the Commerce Control List, including the space entries in the “9×515” series.
The stakes are high on both sides. A wilful ITAR violation can bring a criminal fine of up to $1,000,000 per violation and up to 20 years in prison, and the inflation-adjusted civil penalty under 22 CFR 127.10 is now up to $1,271,078 or twice the value of the transaction, whichever is greater. The Export Control Reform Act (50 U.S.C. 4819) carries the same criminal maximums, and its civil penalty, adjusted for inflation in 15 CFR 6.3, is up to $374,474 or twice the transaction value.
How satellites moved between the lists
In the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, section 1513, Congress moved every satellite and related item then on the Commerce Control List to the Munitions List.
Congress reversed course in section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which repealed the 1999 transfer and let the President decide which satellites still warranted ITAR control. It kept one hard line: satellites and related items moved to the EAR may not be exported to, or launched in or by, China, North Korea or any State sponsor of terrorism, unless the President waives the ban case by case after notifying Congress.
The move took effect through two rules published on 13 May 2014. State’s rule revised Category XV, mostly from 10 November 2014, and BIS created ECCNs 9A515, 9B515, 9D515 and 9E515. The most recent changes are BIS rules of 23 October 2024 that eased licence requirements for allies, removing them for certain remote sensing and servicing spacecraft going to Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. The same day, State proposed changes to Categories IV and XV.
What stays on the ITAR
Category XV(a) lists the spacecraft that remain defence articles, whatever their claimed end-use. They include spacecraft that detect nuclear detonations or autonomously track moving ground, airborne, missile or space objects in real time; that conduct signals or measurement and signature intelligence, or work in a constellation forming a “virtual satellite” with any of the listed functions; that are anti-satellite or carry space-to-ground weapons; and that carry high-end sensors, such as visible and near-infrared imagers with a clear aperture greater than 0.50 m, or radar outside a defined commercial window (1 GHz to 10 GHz with less than 300 MHz of bandwidth).
The list also covers spacecraft that provide positioning, navigation and timing signals, that autonomously perform collision avoidance, that inspect or survey another spacecraft or service one by grappling or docking (unless docking only through the NASA Docking System), and anything classified or built with classified information.
The International Space Station and the James Webb Space Telescope are expressly excluded. Category XV(f) adds technical data and defence services. Two of those services catch many commercial firms: assisting a foreign person to integrate a satellite with a launch vehicle, “regardless of the jurisdiction, ownership, or origin of the satellite”, and assisting in a launch failure analysis. In other words, an EAR satellite does not take its launch campaign with it to the EAR.
What sits on the EAR
ECCN 9A515.a covers every other spacecraft. Note 1 to the entry says it includes commercial communications satellites, remote sensing satellites, sub-orbital craft and planetary probes not caught by Category XV. Within it, four sub-paragraphs are more tightly controlled: electro-optical remote sensing with a clear aperture over 0.35 m up to 0.50 m (a.1), remote sensing beyond near infrared (a.2), certain radar satellites (a.3), and spacecraft that provide logistics, assembly or servicing of other spacecraft (a.4). These need a licence for every destination except Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. The rest of 9A515.a is controlled for national security, regional stability and anti-terrorism reasons, so licence needs depend on the destination.
Two drafting rules matter in deals. A 9A515 spacecraft stays under the EAR even if an ITAR item, such as a hosted payload, is built into it, unless the combination turns it into a Category XV spacecraft. But removing that ITAR item, or sharing its technical data, still needs ITAR approval. And Note 3 to Category XV(f) confirms that ordinary telemetry, meaning data on a spacecraft’s health, status or measurements, or raw sensor output, is not controlled technical data.
For remote sensing companies, export classification sits alongside the separate NOAA operating licence covered in our NOAA remote sensing explainer. Servicing companies should read the a.4 and Category XV(a)(12) lines alongside the mission authorisation questions in our in-orbit servicing piece.
What counts as an export
The definitions are wider than most founders expect. Under 22 CFR 120.50, an ITAR export includes shipping an item out of the United States, releasing technical data to a foreign person inside the United States, performing a defence service for a foreign person, and “transferring registration, control, or ownership of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite” subject to the ITAR to a foreign person. A release to a foreign person in the United States counts as an export to every country of which that person is or has been a citizen or permanent resident.
The EAR definition in 15 CFR 734.13 is similar. A deemed export is attributed to the person’s most recent citizenship or permanent residency. Transferring registration, control or ownership of a servicing spacecraft to any foreign person is an export, as is transferring any other EAR spacecraft to a national of a Country Group D:5 country.
In practice, hiring becomes an export control decision, because a foreign national engineer may need a licence before seeing controlled data, and selling a satellite in orbit, or the company that controls it, can be an export even though nothing moves.
One activity is expressly carved out. Under 22 CFR 120.54(a)(1), “launching a spacecraft, launch vehicle, payload, or other item into space” is not an export.
Launching outside the United States
22 CFR 124.15 imposes special controls on exports of Category XV items, and related defence services, for launches in, or by nationals of, countries that are not NATO members or major non-NATO allies. Every licence needs a technology transfer control plan approved by the Defense Department and an encryption technology control plan approved by the National Security Agency. The exporter must arrange, and pay for, Defense Department monitoring of technical meetings, satellite processing, integration and the launch itself.
Two further rules in the same section reach beyond the ITAR. If a launch from a foreign country fails, US persons need express approval to take part in any investigation, with Defense Department monitoring, even if the satellite was exported under the EAR. And none of the ITAR exemptions can be used to export technical data to obtain or satisfy insurance: underwriters’ access always needs prior approval, which belongs in the timetable for any launch and in-orbit insurance placement.
The country lists matter as much as the procedures. Under 22 CFR 126.1, the United States applies a policy of denial to defence exports to Belarus, Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela, with further country-specific restrictions on others, including Russia. Combined with the statutory ban on EAR satellites in section 1261, this is why US-built satellites, and satellites with ITAR components, stay off Chinese launch vehicles. These restrictions flow into launch services agreements as export compliance warranties and as conditions on any change of launch provider.
The 1 October 2026 proposal
On 1 October 2026 the State Department published a proposed rule reviewing the Munitions List and related definitions (91 FR 62361, RIN 1400-AF40). It cites Executive Order 14268 of 9 April 2025, which directs the Department to focus ITAR controls on the most sensitive technologies. Most of the rule concerns other categories, a new section 120.35 listing items excluded from the definition of defence article, and a new exemption for temporarily exporting a foreign defence article to its foreign manufacturer.
One change is aimed squarely at space. The Department proposes to rewrite section 120.54(a)(1) so that the carve-out covers launching an article “into or beyond orbit”, instead of “into space”. The preamble explains that “into space” is not defined, and that launches that do not reach orbit and return directly to the United States are already not exports under a separate rule. The Department presents this as a clarification rather than a change of scope, but the message for anyone planning point-to-point sub-orbital transport is plain: a sub-orbital flight that carries an ITAR article and lands abroad cannot rely on the launch carve-out. Comments are due by 30 November 2026, through Regulations.gov docket DOS-2026-0991.
A practical checklist
For a US space company, the questions to settle at the start are how each item, including software and technical data, is classified; which employees, contractors and investors are foreign persons and what they will see; where the satellite will be integrated and launched; and who will need technical data for insurance, financing or a future sale.
For a company outside the United States, the question is what US content it buys. An ITAR component keeps its ITAR status inside a foreign satellite, and re-exports or retransfers need State approval, which is why some non-US manufacturers have marketed satellites as “ITAR-free”. Other governments add their own export control and space licensing layers on top; for the UK’s licensing side, see our UK space law explainer.
What I would watch
The first is the comment period on the 1 October proposal, which closes on 30 November 2026. Industry will want clarity on how “orbit” is measured for sub-orbital vehicles.
The second is the October 2024 proposal on Categories IV and XV. A final rule would show whether the State Department accepts industry calls to move more remote sensing and servicing spacecraft to the EAR.
The third is servicing and proximity operations. Spacecraft that inspect or dock with others are among the most tightly controlled on both lists, and they are also the fastest-growing commercial segment. I expect pressure for licence exceptions among allies that mirror the Australia, Canada and UK treatment.
The fourth is enforcement. With civil ITAR penalties now above $1.2 million per violation, and deemed exports easy to commit in a hiring-heavy industry, the first large penalty against a new-space company would reset compliance budgets across the sector.
Questions people actually ask
Are satellites controlled under ITAR or EAR?
Both, depending on the satellite. Spacecraft with functions listed in US Munitions List Category XV, such as signals intelligence, high-end imaging, navigation signals, autonomous collision avoidance or servicing by grappling, are ITAR-controlled. Other spacecraft, including most commercial communications satellites, fall under ECCN 9A515 of the EAR.
What is a deemed export in the space industry?
A deemed export is the release of controlled technical data or technology to a foreign person inside the United States, for example a foreign national engineer working on a satellite programme. Under the ITAR it is treated as an export to every country of the person’s citizenship or permanent residency, and under the EAR to the most recent one.
Is launching a satellite an export?
Under 22 CFR 120.54(a)(1), launching a spacecraft or payload into space is not itself an export. But taking the satellite abroad for launch is, and helping a foreign party integrate a satellite with a launch vehicle is an ITAR defence service regardless of the satellite’s jurisdiction. A proposal of 1 October 2026 would limit the carve-out to launches into or beyond orbit.
Can US satellites be launched on Chinese rockets?
Not in practice. China is subject to an ITAR policy of denial under 22 CFR 126.1, and section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 bars EAR-controlled satellites from being exported to China or launched there or by Chinese entities, unless the President grants a case-by-case waiver after notifying Congress.
What are the penalties for violating satellite export controls?
Wilful violations can bring criminal fines of up to $1,000,000 per violation and up to 20 years in prison under both regimes. Civil penalties, adjusted for inflation, reach $1,271,078 per violation under the ITAR and $374,474 under the EAR, or twice the transaction value if greater.
Do export controls apply to satellite insurance?
Yes. Under 22 CFR 124.15(d), no ITAR exemption can be used to export technical data to insurers or underwriters to obtain or satisfy insurance. Sharing that data always needs prior State Department approval, so operators should build the licence into their insurance timetable.

