Is Satellite Jamming Illegal? GPS Interference, the ITU Rules and the Military Exception

Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania have repeatedly reported to the ITU interference with satellite navigation that affects aircraft, ships and mobile networks. European broadcast satellites have had channels disrupted by signals that the ITU’s own board said seemed to come from earth stations in Russia. Satellite jamming has moved from a niche technical problem to a recurring one, and the obvious question is whether any of it is legal.

The short answer is no, with one large exception. This explainer sets out the international rules, the national criminal laws, how a complaint works in practice and why the system struggles when the jammer is a government.

What jamming and harmful interference mean

Jamming means transmitting radio energy on a frequency so that a receiver cannot pick up the signal it wants. It can target the uplink, drowning out signals sent up to a satellite, or the downlink, overwhelming receivers on the ground or in aircraft. Spoofing is related but different: instead of noise, the transmitter sends a false signal, such as fake GPS timing, so that a receiver calculates the wrong position.

The legal term is “harmful interference”. The ITU Constitution, in its annex, defines it as interference “which endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with the Radio Regulations”. Deliberate jamming will almost always meet that test.

The international rules

The core rule is Article 45 of the ITU Constitution: “All stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Member States”. Each State must also require the operators it authorises to comply.

Article 47 adds that Member States must prevent “the transmission or circulation of false or deceptive distress, urgency, safety or identification signals”, which is where spoofing usually falls.

The Radio Regulations, the treaty-status rulebook that sits under the Constitution, add detail. No. 15.1 says: “All stations are forbidden to carry out unnecessary transmissions, or the transmission of superfluous signals, or the transmission of false or misleading signals, or the transmission of signals without identification.” No. 4.10 recognises that radionavigation and other safety services “require special measures” to protect them, and No. 15.28 gives aviation safety frequencies “absolute international protection”. The ITU’s Radio Regulations Board relies on these provisions in its satellite navigation cases, which is why interference with GPS and Galileo receivers used by aircraft and ships is treated as a safety matter rather than a commercial one.

Space law adds a further layer. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty requires a State that has reason to believe its activities would cause “potentially harmful interference” with other States’ space activities to consult first. Our explainer on ITU spectrum and orbital slots shows why recorded frequency assignments carry a right to protection from harmful interference in the first place.

The military exception

Article 48 of the ITU Constitution is headed “Installations for National Defence Services”. It says: “Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations.” The next paragraph qualifies this: those installations “must, so far as possible, observe statutory provisions relative to giving assistance in case of distress and to the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference”.

That phrase, “so far as possible”, carries most of the weight in modern jamming disputes. A State jamming from a military installation will argue that it needs to, for example to protect its own infrastructure. The other side will argue that “so far as possible” does not extend to blanketing a neighbour’s airspace for months.

The ITU’s Radio Regulations Board has taken a clear view on one point. At its 99th meeting, held from 14 to 18 July 2025, it “emphasized that a military conflict between two nations could not justify the non-respect by those nations of their obligations under the ITU instruments with respect to other nations”, particularly where the interference puts at risk “the critical infrastructures and lives of these other nations not party to the conflict”. In other words, a war with one State is not a licence to jam its neighbours. The wider question of what military activity in space the law permits is covered in our piece on space weapons and the Outer Space Treaty.

How a complaint works

Companies cannot complain to the ITU directly. A satellite operator reports interference to its own national regulator, which takes the case up with the regulator of the State where the signal appears to originate, using the procedure in Article 15 of the Radio Regulations. That State must acknowledge the report promptly (No. 15.35) and, where a safety service is affected, investigate and take remedial action (No. 15.37).

If that fails, the affected administration can ask the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau for help and the Radio Regulations Board can consider the case. The Board can find facts, publish its conclusions, urge an administration to act and organise meetings. It cannot impose penalties, order compensation or switch anything off. Beyond that, Article 56 of the Constitution lets States settle disputes by negotiation, diplomacy or arbitration, but arbitration needs a willing State on the other side.

The cases that show how it works

The clearest example involved broadcast satellites. At its 96th meeting, from 24 to 28 June 2024, the Board considered complaints from France, Sweden, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ukraine about interference with satellite networks at 5°E, 10°E, 13°E and 21.5°E. According to the minutes, it described the interference, which “seemed to originate from earth station(s) located in the areas of Moscow, Kaliningrad and Pavlovka”, as “extremely worrisome and unacceptable”, and asked Russia “to immediately cease any deliberate action to cause harmful interference”.

Satellite navigation is the larger problem. The ITU now keeps a dedicated page on harmful interference to RNSS, the radionavigation-satellite service. It records that at the 99th meeting Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania reported interference affecting “safety of life services, civil aviation and maritime services”, and that the Board concluded the interference “was deliberately caused to RNSS receivers in the region by the Russian Federation as a means to protect its infrastructure”. At the 101st meeting, from 23 to 27 March 2026, the Board noted that Latvia had received no response to its reports. At the 102nd meeting, from 29 June to 3 July 2026, Lithuania reported continued GNSS jamming and spoofing and still no reply, and the Board “strongly urged” Russia to stop.

The one success on the same page involved the Middle East. Jordan and Egypt complained of interference to navigation signals from Israel. After the Bureau convened meetings on 10 July 2025, Israel committed to limit transmissions to situations involving “an imminent and verifiable threat to human life or critical national infrastructure” and to a maximum of 15 minutes. The Board later recorded that no further complaints had been received and treated the cases as resolved. On 17 March 2025 the heads of the ITU, the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization had also issued a joint statement calling on all parties to protect satellite navigation signals.

The pattern is consistent. Where the jamming State engages, the ITU process can produce limits. Where it does not, the process produces a record and little else. The Board’s role in a different kind of dispute, over unauthorised Starlink transmissions from Iran, is covered in our piece on whether Starlink is legal.

National law: jamming is a crime

Domestic law is far less forgiving than the ITU, because it binds individuals and companies, and States enforce it.

In the United States, 47 U.S.C. 333 provides that “No person shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio communications of any station licensed or authorized” under the Communications Act “or operated by the United States Government”. A separate criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. 1367, punishes anyone who, without the operator’s authority, “intentionally or maliciously interferes with the authorized operation of a communications or weather satellite or obstructs or hinders any satellite transmission”, with a fine or up to ten years in prison. The FCC’s enforcement guidance states that “Federal law prohibits the operation, marketing, or sale of any type of jamming equipment”, including GPS blockers, while noting that use by federal law enforcement is authorised under applicable statutes.

In the United Kingdom, section 68 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 provides that “A person commits an offence if he uses apparatus for the purpose of interfering with wireless telegraphy”. Many other countries have similar offences, and Article 45 of the ITU Constitution obliges each State to require the operators it authorises to respect the interference rules.

So a truck driver with a cheap GPS blocker, a company that interferes with a competitor or a hacker who jams a satellite uplink faces real legal risk. A government using military installations faces mainly diplomatic pressure.

Where this leaves satellite operators

The practical lessons are modest. Record and geolocate interference, because the ITU process runs on evidence supplied by administrations. Report early through the national regulator and push for the case to reach the Board, since publication is the main lever the system has. Build resilience into designs and contracts, a theme that also runs through our article on US satellite cybersecurity bills. And check insurance wording: deliberate interference by a State may fall under war or government action exclusions.

What I would watch

The first is the 103rd meeting of the Radio Regulations Board. The Bureau has been told to report on progress in the Lithuanian case, and a further escalation in language, or a referral to the ITU Council or Plenipotentiary Conference, would show whether the Union is willing to go beyond urging.

The second is aviation. ICAO and the IMO have joined the ITU in calling for protection of navigation signals, and safety regulators may harden requirements for receivers and procedures on aircraft and ships. That would shift some of the cost of jamming onto operators, which is a legal outcome in itself.

The third is national enforcement against private users by regulators such as the FCC and Ofcom. Those are the cases where the law has real teeth.

The fourth is the military exception. Every new conflict makes the words “so far as possible” in Article 48 do more work. I would not expect an amendment soon, but I would expect more States to argue publicly over what they mean.

Anuj KumarEditor-in-Chief

Anuj Kumar is the founder of Legal Desire Media and publishes Fashion Law Journal and Space Law Journal.

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