Who Owns the Geostationary Orbit? The Bogota Declaration and Colombia’s Contested Claim
Who owns the geostationary orbit? The 1976 Bogota Declaration, Article II, the ITU's equitable access rules and Colombia's contested 2024 declaration.
Many of the satellites that carry television, weather imagery and long-haul communications sit in one thin ring above the equator. Because they hover over the same spot on the ground, the ring is valuable, crowded and finite. That raises a question students ask in their first week of space law and diplomats have argued about for fifty years: who owns it?
The short answer is nobody. The longer answer involves a 1976 declaration by equatorial States, a compromise worked out at the United Nations in 2000, an ITU system of filings and plans, and a Colombian treaty declaration that drew a string of formal objections only last year.
Why the geostationary orbit is different
A satellite in geostationary orbit circles the Earth once every sidereal day, 23 hours 56 minutes and 4 seconds, at an altitude of 35,786 km above the equator, according to the European Space Agency. From the ground it appears fixed, so antennas can point at it without tracking. That makes the orbit ideal for broadcasting, communications and weather observation.
The catch is that there is only one such ring. Satellites need spacing to avoid crowding and radio interference, so usable positions for a given band and service area are limited. To countries that were not launching satellites in the 1960s and 1970s, first come, first served looked like the rich world fencing off a shared resource.
The Bogota Declaration
Representatives of equatorial States met in Bogota from 29 November to 3 December 1976. Their Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries made three main claims.
First, it said the geostationary orbit “is a physical fact linked to the reality of our planet because its existence depends exclusively on its relation to gravitational phenomena generated by the earth, and that is why it must not be considered part of the outer space”. From that it concluded that “the segments of geostationary synchronous orbit are part of the territory over which Equatorial states exercise their national sovereignty”.
Second, it set out how that sovereignty would work. Devices placed permanently in a State’s segment would need its “previous and expressed authorization” and would operate under its national law. Satellites passing through would be allowed. The segments above the high seas would be “common heritage of mankind”.
Third, it attacked the Outer Space Treaty directly. Because the treaty does not define outer space, the declaration argued, “Article II should not apply to geostationary orbit”.
The version of the text published by JAXA lists Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire at the end.
Why the sovereignty claim failed
The legal case against the declaration rests on Article II of the Outer Space Treaty: “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Wherever the lower boundary of outer space lies, and there is still no agreed line, as our piece on where space begins explains, an orbit at nearly 36,000 km is far above any altitude anyone has proposed as airspace.
The physical argument was also weak, since the orbit exists because of the Earth’s gravity and rotation as a whole, not the territory below any arc. And State practice did not follow the claim: satellites have been placed in the orbit for decades without the prior authorisation the declaration demanded. Our Outer Space Treaty explainer covers how Article II has been read more generally.
Yet the declaration was not pointless. It put equitable access on the agenda, and that is where the law moved.
The 2000 compromise at the UN
The question stayed on the agenda of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for decades. In 1996 Colombia submitted a working paper on the use of the geostationary orbit, which the Legal Subcommittee could not endorse. In 2000 the Subcommittee adopted a short paper, “Some aspects concerning the use of the geostationary orbit”, published as Annex III to its report A/AC.105/738.
The paper quotes Article 44 of the ITU Constitution, which says that radio frequencies and associated orbits, “including the geostationary-satellite orbit, are limited natural resources” that must be used “rationally, efficiently and economically” so that countries “may have equitable access to those orbits and frequencies, taking into account the special needs of the developing countries and the geographical situation of particular countries”. Colombia’s Constitutional Court has read ITU language of this kind as a partial recognition of the equatorial States’ position.
The Subcommittee’s recommendation was modest. Where countries coordinate the use of the orbit, access “must take place, inter alia, in an equitable manner and according to the ITU Radio Regulations”, and a country that already has access “should take all practicable steps” to enable a developing country with a comparable request to have equitable access. That is not a sovereignty right. It is a soft obligation to share, routed through the ITU.
The item is still alive. COPUOS’s 2026 report, A/81/20, shows the Legal Subcommittee still working under an agenda item on “the character and utilization of the geostationary orbit”.
Colombia has not let go
Colombia wrote the claim into its 1991 Constitution. Article 101, as quoted in Colombia’s 2013 submission to COPUOS, lists the subsoil, territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone and airspace, and then “the segment of the geostationary orbit, the electromagnetic spectrum and the zone in which it operates” as part of Colombia, “in accordance with international law or, in the absence of relevant international legislation, Colombian laws”.
The same submission quotes the Constitutional Court’s decision C-278 of 2004 on amendments to the INTELSAT agreement. The Court described Colombia’s position as one of “‘non-traditional’ sovereignty” over the orbit and required an interpretative declaration that Colombia “has not renounced sovereignty over the segment of the geostationary orbit that corresponds to it”.
Colombia then did something that turned an old debate into a live treaty question. It ratified the Outer Space Treaty, which entered into force for Colombia on 21 March 2024, according to the UNOOSA treaty status page. With its ratification it made an interpretative declaration, reproduced in the UK Foreign Office’s status list for the treaty, that “reaffirms, pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 of the Constitution, that the segment of the geostationary orbit corresponding to Colombia is part of Colombia” and that no part of the treaty “contradicts the rights claimed by the Colombian State”.
Objections followed. France and Germany sent notes dated 27 January 2025 and the United Kingdom a note dated 19 March 2025, each saying the declaration has no effect on Colombia’s obligations under Article II and is “incompatible with the object and purpose” of the treaty. The Dutch government’s treaty database also records objections from Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden in early 2025, with Canada and the Netherlands treating the declaration as a reservation to Article II. Mexico followed with a note dated 28 October 2025, stating that “the geostationary orbit is part of outer space and therefore cannot be subject to national appropriation”. Each objecting State said the treaty still enters into force between it and Colombia.
In practical terms, the objecting States have put on record that Colombia is bound by Article II in full and that its declaration changes nothing.
How geostationary slots are actually allocated
Day to day, the working system is the ITU’s. An administration files on behalf of an operator, coordinates with others whose networks might be affected, and records the assignment in the Master International Frequency Register. In most bands this works on a first come, first served basis, which is exactly the outcome the 2000 paper said “may disadvantage developing countries”. Our explainer on how ITU filings decide who gets orbital slots covers the mechanics, including the bringing-into-use deadlines.
For some bands the ITU uses plans instead. As the ITU has explained, the 1977 World Administrative Radiocommunication Conference adopted a broadcasting-satellite plan, now Appendices 30 and 30A of the Radio Regulations, that assigned each Member State channels for domestic direct-to-home television, with Region 2 countries added in 1983. The 1988 conference, WARC Orb-88, added Appendix 30B, which gives each country national allotments in parts of the C and Ku bands, “guaranteeing equitable access to orbits for every ITU Member State”. Those plans are the closest thing the law has to a reserved national slot, and they are the practical answer to the grievance behind Bogota.
A satellite in an assigned position is still not property in the orbit. What the operator holds is a national licence and an internationally recorded frequency assignment at a nominal orbital position. Even leaving the orbit is regulated: the FCC fined DISH for failing to move a satellite far enough above the geostationary arc at end of life, as we discussed in our note on the DISH orbital debris fine.
What I would watch
The first is Colombia’s response to the objections. I have seen nothing to suggest it has withdrawn the declaration. If it raises the point at COPUOS or the ITU, expect the objecting States to restate their view that Article II applies in full.
The second is pressure on the planned bands. As new operators seek geostationary capacity, the value of unused national allotments under Appendix 30B rises. How those allotments can be used, shared or converted is where the equitable access principle now does its real work.
Questions people actually ask
Who owns the geostationary orbit?
No one. Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty says outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, use, occupation or any other means. Access to geostationary positions and frequencies is coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union, which treats the orbit as a limited natural resource to be used equitably.
What was the Bogota Declaration?
The Bogota Declaration, adopted on 3 December 1976 by equatorial States meeting in Colombia, claimed that the geostationary orbit was not part of outer space and that the segments above each equatorial State were under its sovereignty. The text published by JAXA lists Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire.
Is the Bogota Declaration legally binding?
No. It was a political declaration, not a treaty, and it conflicts with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. Satellites have been placed in geostationary orbit for decades without the prior authorisation it demanded. Its legacy is political: it kept equitable access to the orbit on the agenda, leading to a 2000 UN Legal Subcommittee paper on the subject.
Does Colombia still claim part of the geostationary orbit?
Yes. Article 101 of Colombia’s 1991 Constitution lists the segment of the geostationary orbit as part of Colombian territory. When the Outer Space Treaty entered into force for Colombia on 21 March 2024, Colombia declared that its segment of the orbit is part of Colombia and that the treaty does not contradict that claim.
Which countries objected to Colombia's Outer Space Treaty declaration?
Germany, France, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden objected in early 2025, and Mexico in a note dated 28 October 2025. They said the declaration was incompatible with the treaty’s object and purpose or had no legal effect, but none opposed the treaty entering into force with Colombia.
How do countries get a geostationary orbital slot?
Through the ITU. A national administration files for frequency assignments at an orbital position, coordinates with affected networks and records the assignment. Most bands work on a first come, first served basis, while the planned bands in Appendices 30, 30A and 30B of the Radio Regulations give each Member State national assignments or allotments.
Anuj KumarEditor-in-Chief
Anuj Kumar is the founder of Legal Desire Media and publishes Fashion Law Journal and Space Law Journal.
Space Law Journal is a joint initiative of Legal Desire Media and Odyogeek. Spotted something we got wrong, or want to respond? Write to space@legaldesire.com.
